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ABSTRACT

Beyond actual institutional influences, entrepreneurs’ perceptions of institutions
and their potential inconsistencies in interpreting institutional change may influence
entrepreneurial intent to quit a business. Especially at the microentrepreneurial level,
inconsistencies in perceptions of institutional change may variously affect individuals’
intent to abandon their business, seek jobs in other sectors, or even continue in business
despite regulatory institutional changes making their business legally untenable. Our goal
in this research is to empirically measure these intents in the face of inconsistent
perceptions of institutional change with a sample of 660 street vendors from different
cities in Vietnam. We find that perception of the two theoretical constructs, actions as
rules and diminished utility of regulatory control, are negatively correlated with intent to
quit a business, which is consistent with our hypotheses. Contrary to what we
hypothesized, however, microentrepreneurial intent to exit their business is positively
correlated with perceptions of retrospective legitimization. Implications for future
research and public policy are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Walking down the bustling streets in Vietnam’s big cities, one is likely to see
street vendors wearing the cone shaped non la (leaf hat), pushing carts or carrying
shoulder poles with baskets containing a wide range of items from prepared snack food,
to fresh fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and many more. Buying and selling on Vietnam’s
city streets is part of Vietnamese culture (Dana, 1994). This type of retailing has thrived
because it satisfies Vietnamese consumers’ needs. It is fast; it is easy; and it adds the
convenience of being right at the doorsteps.
As Vietnam transitions from a controlled market toward a more open market,
institutional changes have had substantial impacts on the many businesses of street
vendors— the quintessential microentrepreneurs of Vietnamese culture. However, in an
attempt to create a modern look for big cities, the Vietnamese government has tried to
clear streets by imposing a ban on streets vending. In addition, Vietnamese consumers are
changing their shopping habits toward more Western means of retail distribution favoring
modern shopping outlets such as Big C or Metro Cash and Carry (Lincoln, 2008; Jensen
& Peppard, 2007).
Further, WTO membership requires that Vietnam gradually open its markets to
international players. Regulations in the retailing industry have been loosened to
encourage foreign investors to enter the market but tightened to reduce the number of
1

street vendors to create a more “Western look” for Vietnamese cities. While street
vending has, at least, in part continued, it is now done in a less favorable institutional
environment. We explore in this research whether multilevel institutional changes (Seo &
Creed, 2002) have affected street vendors’ intentions to stay in the business or to switch
to other occupations. In fact, beyond actual institutional influences, microentrepreneurs’
perceptions of institutions and potential institutional inconsistencies (Seo & Creed, 2002)
may influence these microentrepreneurs’ quit intentions. Inconsistencies in perceptions of
institutional change may variously affect individuals’ intent to abandon their business or
even continue in business despite regulatory institutional changes making their business
legally untenable.
Our goal in this research is to measure these sociocognitive intentions
(Gustafsson, 2009) in the face of inconsistent perceptions of institutional change (Seo &
Creed, 2002). This blending of micro-level entrepreneurialism with macro-level
institutional data provides a rich theoretical context that enhances the multifaceted
theoretical context faced by microentrepreneurs and provides a more nuanced answer to
our research question. In addition, this micro-macro approach treads the ground from
micro-focused organization behavior as such as microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit to
theory typically used to explain the bases of compliance and order, mechanisms, logics,
indicators, and bases of legitimacy of institutional features of national importance (Scott
& Davis, 2007, p. 258-261). By blending these two seemingly disparate literatures, we
believe we can test some novel questions. Indeed, the three contructs that are at the root
of our hypotheses—actions as rules, retrospective legitimization, and diminished utility
of administrative controls—have never been tested empirically. Although they emerged
2

from the in-depth qualitative work of Droege and Brown-Johnson (2007) for the action as
rules and retrospective legitimization contructs and the Droege and Marvel (2010)
qualitative construct of diminished utility of administrative controls, our research is the
first to empirically test these qualitatively-derived constructs.
The next section will present the conceptual background for our research question
and hypotheses. We then report our results using scales drawn from the mesoinstitutional theory literature (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, Droege & Marvel, 2010).
Our scales measured perceived changes in Vietnam’s institutional environment; we then
use these microentrepreneurs’ intents to react in the face of these perceived institutional
changes in light of correlations and multiple regression to dig out the nuances that may
have been hidden or gone unrecognized in the original qualitative data. Following this,
we (1) explain how our results extend extant institutional theoretical perspectives, (2)
infer potential public policy implications these perspectives may have going forward in
Vietnam’s efforts toward perceived economic progress, and (3) draw conclusions based
on our findings.

3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Introduction
Microentrepreneurial facets of street vending belong to the informal sector of a
society’s economic activities. These microentrepreneurs consist of enterprises that
usually are unregistered, operated by individuals or families, do not generate any taxes,
and consist of persons who cannot secure regular employment (Woodworth, 2000).
Although some regard this type of microentrepreneurship as a gray market distinguished
by “disguised unemployment” (Harris & Todaro, 1970), others affirm that street vending
is a vital means in helping the poor feed their families and sustain day-by-day survival
(Tinker, 1997). It is worth noting that street vending is not just a temporary, spontaneous
business practice. Street vendors use the same mechanics as other business activities.
They raise capital through various institutional arrangements. They develop and make
innovations in selling techniques. They try to protect the property that they informally
acquired (Jaffe, Carciente, & Zanoni, 2007). In short, they are institutional entrepreneurs
(Droege & Marvel, 2010), those whose en masse methods are serendipitously brought
together through individualistic needs for survival as they assail the boundaries of formal
institutional norms (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007) and where dialectic processes
mitigate the pressures between institutionalization and de-institutionalization (Koane,
2006). This is a typical institutional route taken despite its seeming lack of efficiency
4

(Selznick, 1984) when bridges are still being build between former and emerging
institutions (Oliver, 1992).
The informal economic activities of street vendors are conducted both in
developed and developing countries (Bromley, 2000). For examples, New York City now
houses about 12,557 street vendors (The Street Vendor Project, 2006). These
microentrepreneurs come from a variety of backgrounds including Chinese, Senegalese,
Bangladeshi, Egyptian, Afghani, Mexican, Russian, and many other ethnicities (The
Street Vendor Project, 2006). Street vending is highly regulated in New York City with
rules governing types of goods, locations, operating hours, and licensing. Although such
regulations makes it easier for the government to control the number of street vendors
and their practices, the cap on the number of street permits restricts the number of wantto-be street vendors. The number of migrants—which constitutes the majority of street
vendors in New York City— who want to street vend far exceeds the number of permits
issued. Also, the complex system of regulations and restrictions enforced by seven
different city agencies makes gray market street vending more difficult than in emerging
markets with less formalized institutional frameworks.
From an emerging market perspective, street vending in Mexico City, Mexico, for
example, is not regulated directly by the local government; instead, there are vendor
organizations to help street vendors deal with bureaucracies and help settle conflicts
among vendors (Crossa, 2009; Menocal, 1998). In Kumba, the largest town in the
Southwest province in Cameroon, however, vendors do not have any organizations to
regulate or manage their activities. This informal sector in the economy of Kumba,
5

although providing an important means of supporting the poor’s life, received little
formal institutional support from the government due to the many associated street
vending problems such as traffic congestion and street cluttering. Local government has
recently changed regulations from banning street vending activities to helping street
vendors with food safety and vendor health information (Acho-Chi, 2002), a clear
example of the negotiated structuration of institutionalization (Barley & Tolbert, 1997)
and negotiated boundaries of institutional space (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007). Street
vendors in Vietnam are now facing the same situation that vendors in Kumba were in
(Acho-Chi, 2002), providing support for the statement that microentrepreneurialism is a
global phenomenon (Chossudovsky, 1998) but that its particular local character is path
dependent (Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch, 2009), on national institutional culture (Hayton,
George & Zahra, 2002) with national institutions having predominant effects even over
local cultural adaptation (Tan, 2002).
Vietnamese Street Vendors and Institutional Interference
Street vending represents a small yet highly visible part of the Vietnamese
economy and plays an important role in the life of many poor people (Lincoln, 2008).
This informal economy of Vietnam provides a diverse portfolio of products and employs
a significant portion of workers. The goods that street vendors sell vary from prepared
foods to fresh produce and other household tools. Contrary to the demographics of New
York street vendors who were generally male and well-educated (The Street Vendor
Project, 2006), Vietnamese participants in the street vendor sector were mainly
uneducated and rural women (Lincoln, 2008). Most of the workers came to bigger cities
6

with the hope of changing their life. Jensen and Peppard (2007) recognized that street
vendors left their small towns because the incomes their families earned from farming
were inadequate. However, because these rural-to-urban immigrants lack the necessary
education and skills to find a job in the formal sector, they end up becoming vendors on
streets—jobs requiring little formal education or skills. Although the income they earn
from selling food and other items on the streets is not very high, it is enough for them to
make contributions to their families.
Vietnamese local governments, however, look at street vending in a different way.
They see street vending as “pre-modern, undisciplined urban commercial patterns”
(Lincoln, 2008, p. 263). Stricter policies have been enforced in an attempt to resolve
street vending related problems such as traffic jams, reduced food safety, visual pollution,
and environmental pollution (SBTN, 2008). Regulations have been imposed to limit the
activities of street vending in areas proximate to of tourists attractions or government
buildings (SBTN, 2008). Street vendors inappropriately approaching, following, and
begging visitors to buy goods from tourists has created negative images for tourist
destination cities. Moreover, field observations reveal that even on streets that are not
listed as street vending free zones, the police still have the authority to confiscate street
vendors if they see the potential of these vending businesses to generate crowds. The
government also refers to public health concerns as a reason for the elimination of
vending on streets. Street foods and roadside restaurants are cited to be principal sources
of contagion of public health diseases. Some sources, however, pinpointed that in such
big cities as Ha Noi, it was the antiquated sewer system and the lack of water treatment
facilities that were to blame for the outbreak of public contamination (Lincoln, 2008). In
7

his book Wards of Hanoi, Koh describes the government’s effort to enforce order on the
streets in 1983, 1986, 1991 and 1995 (2005). In July 2008, in an attempt to beautify the
city and improve urban sanitation, food hygiene, and traffic congestion, Ha Noi’s city
government announced a partial ban on street vendors and sidewalk-based commerce.
According to the ban, street businesses in some streets and areas would be forbidden
(Lincoln, 2008). The Peoples’ Committee of Da Nang City also had plans to control the
activities of street vendors. Vending is banned on main streets such as Bach Dang, Tran
Phu, and Le Duan. Street vendors are also not allowed in some strategic areas such as
Cham Museum or March 29 Square (The People Committee of Da Nang City, 2006). The
reason is because most of the government buildings are concentrated in these areas. Also,
these are also popular tourist attractions. In addition, because the number of people from
rural to urban locales has increased rapidly in recent years, the government has
encountered difficulty in controlling and managing rural-to-urban migrants, the majority
of whom become street vendors soon after arriving (Asian Development Bank, 2007).
Increasingly Competitive Business Environment
Traditional street markets are the most common type of retailing in Vietnam.
Jensen and Peppard’s (2007) study reveals that traditional markets were very important to
Vietnamese consumers. Results from their survey show that, on average, virtually all of
the interviewed shoppers went to traditional markets 362 times a year. Besides, Vietnam
joined the WTO in 2007, which makes it easier for foreign retailers to enter the market.
According to 2009 A.T. Kearney Global Retail Development Index, although Vietnam
topped the index in 2008, now stands in 6th place in term of retail development potential
8

among emerging economies. The country now has about 400 supermarkets and 2,000
convenience stores operating by both domestic and global companies. Many global
retailers are established in Vietnam including South Korea’s Lotte, Japan’s Seiyu,
Malaysia’s Parkson, Thailland’s Big C, Hong Kong’s Dairy Farm, Thailand’s CP All and
Germany’s Metro Cash and Carry. It is expected that more international retailers will be
entering the maker in the next few years (Nielsen, 2009). Nielsen Retail Audit reveals
that the number of modern retail trade outlets in Vietnam increased by 16 per cent from
2007 to 2008. Also, the central Vietnamese authorities have been introducing new
policies favoring international players. On January 1, 2009, the Vietnamese government
allowed 100 percent foreign owned retailers to set up. Earlier this year, January 2010, the
door to the entire Vietnamese retail industry is completely open. Foreign traders are now
allowed to execute all kinds of wholesale and retail business in Vietnam (Nielsen, 2009)
but are still banned from traditional state owned business which tend to related to
infrastructure, oil, banking, and similar industries that are more given to wild swings in
price that, at this time, the Vietnamese government would be more comfortable
controlling.
Supermarket chains such as Big C from Thailand and Metro Cash and Carry from
Germany have entered the market and are expanding their operations. They provide the
Vietnamese consumers with modern, Western-styled shopping experiences. These big
supermarkets serve as one-stop shopping sites. Products are presented in an eye catching
way and offered at fixed prices as opposed to the negotiation typical of buying from
street vendors. Customers are also exposed to wider and deeper assortments of
merchandise. These new stores, although still constituting a small fraction of the retail
9

industry, are gaining an increasing number of customers and growing at a rapid pace.
These foreign competitors have put street vendors in a different and harder environment
than they were before. In addition, fast-food chains such as the Philippines Jollibee,
Korean Lotteria and U.S.-based Pizza Hut (part of Yum! Brands) are penetrating the
Vietnamese market, posing significant threat to street food vendors. These foreign-based
restaurants bring new tastes to Vietnamese dining and claim to provide guaranteed
quality. New food items offered in modern dining rooms where young people or families
can sit down and enjoy a meal with their friends are something that Vietnamese street
vendors simply cannot offer.
Consumer’s Changing Shopping Behavior
Traditional markets, street vendors, and mom-and-pop stores are no longer the
only options available to Vietnamese consumers. The new wave of incoming modern
shopping centers has offered shoppers new alternatives. Consumers now shop at
supermarkets such as Big C more often and spend more money there. They believe they
have access to higher quality items at supermarkets. Jensen and Peppard (2007) published
an interesting study about the Vietnamese consumers’ attitudes towards street vendors
given the introduction of large retailers. The study shows that roaming vendors are at a
disadvantage compared to other retail forms. For example, the quality of goods from
street vendors was rated poor; 44 per cent of the interviewees complained about the lack
of freshness and the uncertainty about the origin of the goods.
Besides, consumers go to supermarkets so that they do not have to deal with the
hassle of bargaining at traditional markets or on streets. Life is going at a faster pace,
10

making time and convenience increasingly valued in Vietnamese culture. Moreover, the
young generations of Vietnam are vulnerable to new trends coming from outside,
especially Western styles. Their shopping habits are different from those of their parents
or grandparents. They are interested in new styles and enjoy the comfort and modern feel
that fast-food restaurants and supermarkets offer. Even older generations with increasing
purchasing power favor shopping at big retail stores that offer a one-stop shopping
experience. According to the World Bank (2009), Vietnam has recently enjoyed an
increase in GNI per capita from US$770 to US$890, an increase of about 16 percent. The
rate of poor households decreased from 13.4% in 2008 to 12.3% in 2009 (The World
Bank, 2009).
In conclusion, although representing a significant part of the Vietnamese informal
economy, street vendors are now fighting a harder battle than they were previously with
little institutional support. Regulations are becoming stricter; competition is more intense,
there are newer, more reliable, and more convenient types of retailing and consumers are
changing their shopping habits in favor of modern outlets.
Theory and Hypotheses
Much of the intent literature in entrepreneurship “refers to the intention of an
individual to start a new business” (Engle et al., 2010, p. 38) and the many factors that
influence such entrepreneurial intentions including motives, attitudes, and behaviors as
captured in the entrepreneurial orientation construct (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) or success
predictors such as adaptive and generative learning as captured in the learning orientation
construct (Senge, 1990). These types of constructs have sometimes been combined in
11

efforts to better understand firm performance such as Wang’s (2008) research providing
evidence that learning orientation mediates between entrepreneurial orientation and firm
performance. Choo and Wong (2006) studied the key motives as well as barriers to
starting a business among mid-career individuals using data from military officers from
the Singapore Armed Forces. Liñán and Chen’s (2009) recent research used the
Entrepreneurial Intention Questionnaire (EIQ) to test an individual’s intention of starting
a business in Spain or Taiwan using attitude toward start-up, subjective norms, and
perceived behavior control. In addition, although an individual’s drive and commitment
plays an important role in setting up a business, Smallbone and Welter (2001) have
mentioned how social, economic, political and institutional environments dominantly
influence the creation of new businesses.
Our research, however, looks at the other side of the question: Do perceptions of
changing institutions influence microentrepreneurs to quit? That is, rather than
considering the intent to form a business, do certain institutional characteristics correlate
with the intent to quit a microenterprise?
Meso-Institutional Impact on Microentrepreneurial Intent to Quit
Although the extent of institutional effects are likely to vary depending on a
nation’s market reform stages particularly in transitional economies along with various,
cultural influences and path dependent historical values, empirical evidence suggests
small enterprises still develop despite hostile and unstable national institutional cultures
during market reforms (Smallbone & Welter, 2001). Scott (2008, p. 48) defines
institutions as “regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with
12

associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” Each
institutional element—regulative, cultural-cognitive, and normative—has different effects
on social behaviors and economic activities. Entrepreneurship is certainly not immune
from this influence. It is worth noting that institutional factors, rather than being stable,
experience changes over time (Scott, 2008). Such changes can be observed in transition
countries such as Vietnam, which is moving from a planned economy toward an open
market. When such events occur, certain former institutions tend to disintegrate while
new institutions begin to take shape. This typically, however, does not occur quickly.
Instead, “meso-institutions,” the bridges that hold together element of the old with
elements of new institutions are themselves “weak, intermediate forms of institutions that
bridge the gap between institutional disintegration and the development of new, more
firmly established institutions” (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, p. 81). Similarly to the
case of the Chinese economy discussed in Droege and Brown-Johnson’s (2007) research,
the current institutional condition in Vietnam also provides an illustrative example of
meso-institutions where weak bridges are all that are holding the old and the new
together.
Since Doi Moi (Reformation), the socialist-driven market reforms initiated in
Vietnam in 1986, the Vietnamese economy has undergone a radical change from
centrally planned to market oriented. Old regulations no longer effectively work in new
situations and new institutions are under way to form new order for the society. Mesoinstitutions, however, are not “in themselves change agents” but provide an environment
for changes to take place with the goal of providing incentives for “institutional
entrepreneurship” (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007, p. 83).
13

Droege and Brown-Johnson (2007, p. 93) elucidate meso-institutional
characteristics including actions-as-rules and retrospective legitimization. The mesoinstitutional characteristic of actions-as-rules suggests that rather than having
“institutions give stability to actions, it is actions that give stability and meaning to
institutions.” The institutional rules of the game (North, 1990) are built through the many
trials and errors of meso-institutional experiments whether or not such experimentation is
or is not intentional. Experimentation provides the benefit of allowing actions and
resultant rules to become more in tune with reality. Formal institutionalization is
legitimized post hoc by formal power holders as results are known, lessening risk to
power holders while passing on risk to institutional entrepreneurs in a dialectic and
recursive process of retrospective legitimization (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007). The
drawback, however, is that leaders might be perceived as vacillating for their reluctance
in implementing new rules prior to allowing unwitting institutional entrepreneurs to
“piecemeal” actions and institutions together. These power-holding decision makers, on
the other hand, gain the advantage of knowing the results of the regulatory institutional
decisions before making any moves (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007).
The present research is concerned with how microentrepreneurs’ perception of
these two meso-institution characteristics—actions-as-rules and retrospective
legitimization—affects microentrepreneurs’ intent to exit their business. Researchers
have shown that economic, regulatory, and legal institutions play an important role in
entrepreneurial activities and economic development and that institutions can either
constrain or support various economic activities (Hayton et al., 2002). For example,
according to Manolova, Eunni, and Gyoshev’s study (2008), institutional environments
14

were deemed relatively unfavorable in Latvia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, yet there were still
microentrepreneurs present in these institutionally hostile environments. What is not
known, however, is how many more microentrepreneurs might have contributed to
economic growth had institutions been more malleable toward microentrepreneurs. In
this research, we are interested in discovering whether there are relationships between
perception of institutions and microentrepreneurs’ intent to get out of business. We thus
hypothesize that:
H1: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will be lower as
perceptions of actions-as-rules among microentrepreneurs increase.
H2: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will lessen as
perceptions of retrospective legitimization increase.
Addressing the problem of multi-level institutional change that has been discussed
in recent studies (Seo & Creed, 2002), Droege and Marvel (2010) proposed two process
mechanisms to help explain the link between institutional entrepreneurial participation
and institutional change. Specifically, they are interested in how institutional
entrepreneurial action results in diminished utility of regulatory controls and creates
negotiated boundaries of institutional space. Diminished utility of regulatory controls is
particularly salient to the present study and is defined as “a condition in which
institutions lack sufficient strength to guide collective action” (Droege & Marvel, 2010).
Although former institutions might regain control under conditions of social disorder,
diminished utility of regulatory controls allows collective actions to guide the creation of
more effective institutions, or a “controlled chaos” type of situation (Droege & Brown15

Johnson, 2007). In this study, we investigate whether the perception of diminished utility
of regulatory controls affects the intent to quit a business.
Because diminished utility of administrative controls is counterintuitive to
traditional schema of institutions as guides of social order (e.g., Scott, 2008), applying
this construct in the context of microentrepreneurship is particularly appropriate.
Especially given that (1) the microentrepreneurial street vendors in our sample operate in
the gray market of the economy and (2) recent Vietnamese regulations designed to clean
the streets of street vendors are beginning to be enacted, we question whether
microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit may be shaped by these recent actions. On the other
hand, if regulatory controls are indeed diminished and actions-as-rules have more power
to guide social action than formal regulatory institutions, we hypothesize:
H3: The likelihood of microentrepreneurial intent to quit will lessen as
perceptions of diminished utility of administrative controls increase.

16

METHODS
Survey Design and Methods
The survey was originally developed in English and was then translated into
Vietnamese (Survey copies, in English and Vietnamese, are available in Appendix). We
drew on the available literature for the independent variables of actions-as-rules,
retrospective legitimization (Droege & Brown-Johnson, 2007), and diminished utility of
administrative controls (Droege & Marvel, 2010). Because the literature regarding our
dependent variables of intent to quit a business was sparse, we relied on our experience
living and working in Vietnam to develop the dependent variables.
After developing multiple possible survey items for each construct, we used
exploratory factor analysis via principle components analysis using varimax rotation to
uncover the structure of the items via data from a pilot study of 66 Vietnamese street
vendors. We first used principal components analysis to determine the loadings of each
item on each extracted factor. The loadings were then rotated using Varimax rotation.
The factor analysis is shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Survey Item Factor Loadings
Component
1

2

3

Diminished Utility of Regulatory Control
1. Regulations will never stop street vending.

0.831

2. As rural to urban migration increases, the number of street vending
will also increase.

0.764

3. I would continue to be a street vendor even if the government tells
me to quit.

0.684

4. It is more important to earn a living than to follow regulations.

0.591

Actions As Rules
5. Street vending regulations are ambiguous.

0.749

6. Street vending is only temporarily stopped when the police come in
but then continues once the police leave.

0.678

7. In the future, there will be zones where street vendors are allowed
and there will be zones where street vendors are not allowed.

0.611

8. People are still selling on streets regardless of regulations against
street vending.

0.555

Retrospective Legitimization
9. Restrictions on street vending will be reversed if they are unpopular
among street vendors' customers.

0.811

10. As long as my vending does not generate a crowd, the police will
leave me alone.

0.575

11. If street vending increases employment rates, lawmakers will likely
make street vending legal.

0.559

12. Regulations restricting street vending will be changed if current
regulations have little effect on street vending activities.

0.531

* Indicates Chronbach’s alpha >0.531 (Range = .531 - .831.
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We subsequently ran stepwise multiple regression to simultaneously test and
model multiple independent variables.
Data Collection and Sample
Our sample consisted of 660 street vendors in Vietnam to determine whether a
relationship exists between street vendors’ perception of meso-institutions characteristics
and their intentions to engage in increased or decreased microentrepreneurial activities or
to switch to other services or sectors. Data were collected in four Vietnamese cities:
Hanoi, Hue, Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City. These are among the largest cities in
Vietnam. Compared to street vending in rural areas, many street vendors reported that
they made more money in the urban areas despite the problems they would have to face.
This phenomenon led us to create one dependent variable addressing whether street
vendors intend to return to the rural areas if that was where they were from.
A survey team with research and data collection experience carried out the data
collection process to help ensure the credibility of the data. Table 2 shows summary
demographic data of our respondents.
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Table 2: Summary Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Description of the
Percentage
Number
Item
(N=660)
Gender
Male
182
27.58%
Female
478
72.42%
Age
<20
21
3.18%
20-29
117
17.73%
30-39
251
38.03%
40-49
177
26.82%
50-59
62
9.39%
>=60
32
4.85%
Education
None
83
12.58%
Elementary
275
41.67%
Secondary
247
37.42%
High School
51
7.73%
College and Higher
4
0.61%
City
Ha Noi
20
3.03%
Hue
20
3.03%
Da Nang
222
33.64%
Ho Chi Minh City
398
60.30%
Experience
<1 year
64
9.70%
1-5 years
275
41.67%
5-10 years
202
30.61%
>10 years
119
18.03%
Income Level (compared to
average)
More
31
4.70%
Less
437
66.21%
About the same
192
29.09%
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As can be seen from the summary in Table 2, the majority of street vendors in
Vietnam are female. They make up about 72.42% of the total number of respondents. Most
street vendors are reported to be between 20 and 50 years old. About one third is in the 30s.
As several studies have pointed out (Jensen & Peppard, 2007), most vendors do not acquire

much formal education. About 13% never attended school. Meanwhile, almost half of vendors
on streets just finished elementary school; very few completed high school, and not even 1%

went to college. On the contrary, according to The Street Vendor Project (2006), about 43% of
street vendors in New York City had a college education or higher. Most Vietnamese vendors
have been on streets for about 1 to 5 years. About one-fifth has street selling experience of 10

years or more. When asked about income level, the majority (66.21%) said they earned
less than the average worker in the city. Only about 5% thought their incomes were higher
than the average income level in Vietnam.
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3. As can be seen from the table, the
majority of street vendors intended to continue street vending in the future even if the

political and business environment might not be favorable for them. Descriptive statistics
show a mean of 4.28 and a median of 5 (1 denotes totally disagree and 5 totally agree) for
intent to continue street vending. Besides, if the government prohibited street vending, most
street vendors believed they were more likely to be unemployed than to successfully find
another job in other sectors. Mean values show that most street vendors surveyed did not intend
to forsake their business in the cities to find jobs in other sectors or go back to their hometown.
Besides, correlations matrix is presented in Table 4. The summary tells that

multicollinearity is not a problem as all correlations show values of less than .7.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

INT1
INT2
INT3
INT4
INT5
INT6
AAR
RL
DU

N
Range
Min
Max
Mean
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
660
4
1
5
4.28
660
4
1
5
3.19
660
4
1
5
2.40
660
4
1
5
1.79
660
4
1
5
1.90
660
4
1
5
4.02
660
4.00
1.00
5.00 3.8947
660
4.00
1.00
5.00 3.6899
660
4.00
1.00
5.00 4.2408

Std. Deviation
Statistic
1.181
1.537
1.529
1.256
1.306
1.421
1.10930
0.99220
0.74786

INT1: Intent to continue street vending
INT2: Intent to find a permanent location
INT3: Intent to find a job in another sector
INT4: Intent to go back to hometown and start a new business
INT5: Intent to go back to hometown and find a job in another sector
INT6: Think that they would be unemployed
AAR: Actions as rules
RL: Retrospective legitimization
DU: Diminished utilities of regulatory control
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Table 4: Coefficient Correlations

Correlations

Spearman's

AAR Correlation

rho

AAR

RL

DU

INT1 INT2

INT3

INT4 INT5

INT6

1.000

.085* .102** .315** -.144** -.248** -.144** -.181** .122**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
RL

Correlation

.

.030

.009

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.002

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

.085* 1.000

.089*

.044 .164**

-.037

.062

.091* .164**

Coefficient

DU

Sig. (2-tailed)

.030

.

.022

.258

.000

.345

.113

.019

.000

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

Correlation

.102**

.089* 1.000 .214** -.079* -.093* -.119** -.194** .126**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.009

.022

.

.000

.044

.017

.002

.000

.001

N

659

659

659

659

659

659

659

659

659

INT1 Correlation

.315**

.044 .214** 1.000 -.168** -.306** -.276** -.328** .220**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.258

.000

.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

-.144** .164** -.079* -.168** 1.000 .340**

.084*

.095*

-.049

INT2 Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

.044

.000

.

.000

.031

.015

.211

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

INT3 Correlation

-.248**

-.037 -.093* -.306** .340** 1.000 .237** .232** -.137**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.345

.017

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

.000

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

INT4 Correlation

-.144**

.062 -.119** -.276**

.084* .237** 1.000 .772** -.222**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.113

.002

.000

.031

.000

.

.000

.000

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660
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INT5 Correlation

-.181**

.091* -.194** -.328**

.095* .232** .772** 1.000 -.245**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.019

.000

.000

.015

.000

.000

.

.000

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

-.049 -.137** -.222** -.245**

1.000

INT6 Correlation

.122** .164** .126** .220**

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.002

.000

.001

.000

.211

.000

.000

.000

.

N

660

660

659

660

660

660

660

660

660

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Regression Analysis

Multiple regression results support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2; that is, street
vendors’ perception of actions as rules and diminished utility of regulatory controls are
statistically significant in predicting their intention to continue street vending (p < 0.0001
for both variables). In the INT1 Model Summary from Table 5, it is shown that intent to
continue street vending can be predicted by perception of actions as rules and diminished
utilities of regulatory control. The output reveals that 9.5% of the variance in the intent to
give up a business can be explained by the regression on perception of actions as rules;
when data about perception of diminished utilities is added, they together explain 11.6%
of the variance in the intention. The Sig. column from the Coefficients table for INT1
again tells that both actions as rules and diminished utilizes are significant as predictors
of intent to continue their business. Also, because these independent variables are
significant, 0’s are not found between the lower and upper bounds for 95% confidence
interval for B’s. It can also be interpreted from the table that as perception of actions as
rules increases, the intent to continue business increases or in other words, intent to quit
street vending decreases. The same logic applies to perceptions of diminished utility of
regulatory control when the variable is added in model 2.
Intent to settle down at a permanent location scores are regressed on three
independent variables; only retrospective legitimization and actions as rules show
statistical significance. In the first model from INT2 Model Summary, the result reveals
that 1.9% of the variance in this intent is explained by perception of retrospective
legitimization. When perception of actions as rules is added in model 2, these two
predictors account for approximately 2.6% of the variance in street vendors’ intention to
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find a permanent location for their businesses. Perception of diminished utilities is not
statistically significant in predicting this intention. In addition, it is worth noticing that
perception of retrospective legitimization positively correlates with the intent to vend at a
legal permanent location or in other words, to quit roaming in streets (Beta= .153).
Meanwhile, this intent among street vendors has a negative correlation with their
perception of actions as rules. Therefore, as perception of actions as rules increases,
intent to find a permanent spot, or in other words quit street vending, decreases.
It is shown from the INT3 Model Summary that only perception of actions as
rules is statistically significant in explaining the variance in the intent to find jobs in other
sectors in the cities (R Square= 4.3%). In INT4 Model Summary, the predictor of actions
as rules explains for about 1.5% of the variance in intent to go back to hometown and
establish a new business. When data about perception of retrospective legitimization is
added, the two together explains for 2.7% of the variance in this intent. Similar to INT2
Model Summary, statistics shows a negative correlation between perception of actions as
rules and intent to quit street vending in the cities and a positive correlation between
perception of after the fact legitimization and intent to go home. Moreover, it is worth
noting from INT5 Model Summary that the three independent variables are significant in
explaining street vendors’ intent to go back to their hometown and find a job in another
sector. About 2.5% of the variance is predicted by the most significant variable:
diminished utilities of regulatory control. When perception of actions as rules is added,
4.6% of the variance is explained. When the intent to find another job in hometown is
regressed on the three variables, 6.2% of the variance cane be predicted by the three
variables. Besides, it is shown from the Beta column in INT5 Coefficients that actions as
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rules and diminished utilities of regulatory control are negatively correlated while
retrospective legitimization is, however, positively correlated with the intent to quit street
vending and go back to hometown and find jobs in other industries. Hypothesis 1 and
hypothesis 2, therefore, are supported from the results found in the different multiples
regression models.
Regarding thoughts about the likelihood of being unemployed if the government
put a complete ban on street vending, it is showed in INT6 Model Summary that the three
factors are statistically significant in predicting their thoughts about unemployment.
Actions as rules alone explained 1.8% of the variance in the belief about unemployment;
when retrospective legitimization is added, the two accounts for 3.6% of the variance;
when the intent is regressed on all three independent variables, 4.1% of its variance is
explained.
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Table 5: Regression Results
INT1 Model Summaryc
Std. Error Change Statistics
R
Adjusted of the
R Square F
Sig. F DurbinSquare R Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson

Model R

1
.310a .096 .095
1.124
b
2
.344 .118 .116
1.111
a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, DU
c. Dependent Variable: INT1

.096
.022

69.960 1
16.379 1

657 .000
656 .000

1.573

Coefficientsa
95.0%
Confidence
Interval for B

Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
Model

B

1 (Constant) 2.992

Std.
Error

t

Beta

Correlations

Lower Upper ZeroSig. Bound Bound order Partial

.160

18.715 .000 2.678 3.306

AAR
.330
.039
2 (Constant) 2.050
.281
AAR
.316
.039
DU
.235
.058
a. Dependent Variable: INT1

.310 8.364 .000 .253 .408
7.287 .000 1.497 2.602
.297 8.059 .000 .239 .393
.149 4.047 .000 .121 .350

Part

.310

.310

.310

.310
.176

.300
.156

.295
.148

INT2 Model Summaryc
Change Statistics
Std. Error
R
Adjusted
of the R Square
F
Sig. F DurbinSquare R Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson

Model R
1

.145a

.021

.019

1.521

.021 14.033

1 657

.000

2

b

.029

.026

1.516

.008

1 656

.018

.171

a. Predictors: (Constant), RL
b. Predictors: (Constant), RL, AAR
c. Dependent Variable: INT2
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5.666

1.319

Coefficientsa
95.0%
Confidence
Interval for B

Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
Model

B

1 (Constant) 2.364
RL

Std.
Error
.060

2 (Constant) 2.814

.296

AAR

Beta

.228

.224

RL

t

.236

.060

-.127

.053

Correlations

Lower Upper ZeroSig. Bound Bound order Partial Part

10.358 .000 1.916 2.812
.145 3.746 .000

.106

.341 .145

.145 .145

9.514 .000 2.234 3.395
.153 3.950 .000

.119

.353 .145

.152 .152

-.092 -2.380 .018 -.232 -.022 -.079 -.093 -.092

a. Dependent Variable: INT2

INT3 Model Summaryb

Model R
.207a

1

Change Statistics
Std. Error
of the R Square
R
Adjusted
F
Sig. F DurbinSquare R Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson
.043

.042

1.497

.043 29.494

1 657

.000

1.501

a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR
b. Dependent Variable: INT3

Coefficientsa
95.0%
Confidence
Interval for B

Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
Model

B

1 (Constant) 3.511
AAR

-.285

Std.
Error
.213
.053

t

Beta

Correlations

Lower Upper ZeroSig. Bound Bound order Partial Part

16.492 .000 3.093 3.929
-.207 -5.431 .000 -.389 -.182 -.207 -.207 -.207

a. Dependent Variable: INT3
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INT4 Model Summary
Change Statistics
R
Adjusted R
Square
Square

Model R

Std. Error of
the Estimate

R Square
F
Sig. F
Change Change df1 df2 Change

1

.122a

.015

.013

1.249

.015

9.844

1 657

.002

2

b

.027

.024

1.242

.012

8.234

1 656

.004

.164

a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B

B

1 (Constant)

2.325

.178

13.091 .000

1.976

2.674

-.138

.044

-.122 -3.138 .002

-.224

-.051

1.849

.242

7.630 .000

1.373

2.325

-.148

.044

-.131 -3.390 .001

-.234

-.062

.140

.049

.111 2.869 .004

.044

.237

AAR
2 (Constant)
AAR
RL

Beta

Sig.

Upper
Bound

Model

Std. Error

t

Lower
Bound

a. Dependent Variable: INT4

INT5 Model Summary
Change Statistics
R
Adjusted R
Square
Square

Model R

Std. Error of
the Estimate

R Square
F
Sig. F
Change Change df1 df2 Change

1

.158a

.025

.023

1.291

.025 16.815

1 657

.000

2

.213b

.046

.043

1.279

.021 14.173

1 656

.000

3

c

.062

.058

1.269

.016 11.443

1 655

.001

.249

a. Predictors: (Constant), DU
b. Predictors: (Constant), DU, AAR
c. Predictors: (Constant), DU, AAR, RL
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Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B

1 (Constant)

3.074

.290

10.603 .000

2.504

3.643

-.276

.067

-.158 -4.101 .000

-.408

-.144

3.638

.324

11.235 .000

3.002

4.274

DU

-.253

.067

-.145 -3.782 .000

-.385

-.122

AAR

-.170

.045

-.144 -3.765 .000

-.258

-.081

3.128

.355

8.818 .000

2.432

3.825

DU

-.270

.067

-.154 -4.048 .000

-.400

-.139

AAR

-.182

.045

-.154 -4.051 .000

-.270

-.094

.170

.050

.129 3.383 .001

.071

.268

DU
2 (Constant)

3 (Constant)

RL

Beta

Sig.

Upper
Bound

B

Std. Error

t

Lower
Bound

Model

a. Dependent Variable: INT5

INT6 Model Summary
Change Statistics
Model R

R
Adjusted R
Square
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

R Square
F
Sig. F
Change Change df1 df2 Change

1

.141a

.020

.018

1.395

.020 13.377

1 657

.000

2

.189b

.036

.033

1.385

.016 10.730

1 656

.001

3

.204c

.041

.037

1.382

.006

1 655

.048

a. Predictors: (Constant), AAR
b. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL
c. Predictors: (Constant), AAR, RL, DU
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3.909

Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B

1 (Constant)

3.328

.198

16.771 .000

2.938

3.717

.179

.049

.141 3.657 .000

.083

.275

2.722

.270

10.073 .000

2.191

3.252

AAR

.165

.049

.130 3.389 .001

.070

.261

RL

.179

.055

.126 3.276 .001

.072

.286

2.175

.386

5.628 .000

1.416

2.933

AAR

.157

.049

.124 3.217 .001

.061

.253

RL

.171

.055

.121 3.130 .002

.064

.278

DU

.143

.073

.076 1.977 .048

.001

.286

AAR
2 (Constant)

3 (Constant)

Beta

a. Dependent Variable: INT6
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Sig.

Upper
Bound

B

Std. Error

t

Lower
Bound

Model

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Regression results strongly support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. They give
evidence for the negative correlations between perceptions of actions as rules and
diminished utilities of regulatory control and intent to quit micro-entrepreneurial venture
among street vendors in Vietnam. According to Dreoge and Brown-Johnson’s theory of
meso-institutions (2007, p. 91), actions serve as “rule makers” and institutions
“followers” in transition economies. It is the actions that give stability to institutions
rather than institutions giving stability to actions. Results from our survey of
microentrepreneurial street vendors in Vietnam reveal that as their perception that actions
are becoming the de facto rules, microentrepreneurs’ intent to exit their business
decreases.
Vietnamese businesses have recently faced increasing regulations in attempts to
control their activities. These regulations, although are intended to better the community
as stated by the government (The People Committee of Da Nang City, 2006), do not
reflect the wishes of the majority of Vietnamese street vendors. One vendor put it: “I’m
used to selling on streets. I don’t know what I would do without my street vending.
Nobody is going to hire me.” Another added: “I will street vend till my feet can't move
anymore.” Our study finds that as street vendor’s perception of actions as rules increases,
their intent to continue their business also increases. As street vendors perceive that
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potential new regulations supporting street vending and based on social actions could
replace old ones, they would be more likely to remain in the business.
Similarly, the survey results show a positive correlation between perception of
diminished utilities of regulatory control and microentrepreneur’s intent to quit their
business. One street vendor noted: “If I get caught, I will just pay the fines and continue
to street vend because my whole family rely on my income.” Regulatory controls, as
inferred from street vendors’ responses, although do affect their business, do not have
much power to prevent these microentrepreneurs from continue their business. These
regulations, in fact, do not have practical implication.
Our second hypothesis about the relationship between perception of retrospective
legitimization and intent to quit a business, however, is not supported by regression
results. Multiple regression reveals positive correlation between street vendors’
perception of legitimization after the fact and their intent to abandon their vending. This
could be explained by the distinct socialist political system in Vietnam where the rules
are most of the time created without the will of the people. Although street vendors hoped
that their persistent resistance to follow street vending rules can lead to the changes in
government policies, they were not very optimistic about new regulations emerging from
social actions. Dreoge and Johnson-Brown has mentioned the risk of retrospective
legitimization undermining existing authorizes “because it may imply leaders are reactive
or indecisive” (2007, p. 96).
Results from the survey in Vietnam have helped confirm two of our prepositions
in the relationships between perceptions of meso-institutions and entrepreneurial intent to
35

quit business. Our study, however, is subjective to several limitations. First, our data
come from snowball sampling of street vendors in Vietnam, which is not representative
of the whole street vendor population. A cross study would provide us with a more
comprehensive set of data. Besides, street vendors are only a part of what makes up
microentrepreneurs as Rojas and Siga defines “own-account workers and owners of firms
with less than 16 employees” (2009, p. 2667). These limitations have prevented us from
making a decent generalizability of our study.
Our study has implications for microentrepreneurship theory and public policy.
We try to explore the most ignored part of entrepreneurship and microentrepreneurship
fields: intent to quit business. Most entrepreneurship studies are centered in
entrepreneurial intent to start a new venture; very little research is carried out on the other
end of the subject where entrepreneurs have to think about giving up business because of
the unfavorable institutional factors. We find a statistically significant correlation
between microentrepreneurial perception of actions as rules and microentrepreneurial
intent to quit a business. We also find that as perception of diminished utilities of
regulatory control increases, intent to exit a business decreases. Future research could go
further to generalize the findings on a cross-country study or expand to other micro
business activities. Research about the fractured ideology factor in meso-institution
theory also needs to be extensively studied to see if it has any important roles in
entrepreneurial intent to quit a business. Studies to explain the unconformity of
retrospective legitimization to the theory of meso-institutions are also needed.
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Vietnamese street vendors are facing more problems than they were before
because of new regulations restricting the activities for the many reasons discussed in
earlier sections. Stricter street vending regulations once implemented will force many
street vendors out of their only means of income, which consequently raises
unemployment rate. A number of street vendors admitted that they would be sure
unemployed if they were not allowed to vend on streets. Among the many reason that
they stated were their inadequate education and lack of funds to rent a permanent
location. “I depend on my vending for my income,” one street vendor told us. Another
added:” My family relies on my vending. My kids' education relies on my vending. I can't
imagine my family without my vending.” One of the major effects of stricter street
vending regulations, therefore, is their influence on street vendors’ livelihood. Besides,
ban on street vending will adversely affect consumers who are used to and prefer street
buying rather any other kinds of modern shopping. Street vending is also a valuable piece
of Vietnamese culture. It is what makes a trip to Vietnam more appealing to a large
number of foreign travelers. A post on southeastasianfood.about.com started with the
phrase:”A trip to Vietnam is not complete without tasting the street food” (Sim, n.d.,
para.1). Travelers Eckhardt and Hagerman also wrote about street food in South East
Asia: “if you haven't experienced SE Asian street food, … you've missed out on an
important part of the region's culinary culture” (Eckhardt & Hagerman, 2007, para. 3). In
addition, if street vendors are forced out of work, they will be potentially involved in gray
or black market activities. Since these people do not have the resources to do otherwise,
they are vulnerable to taking part in other illegal business activities. Besides, “social
vices might increase if ban is put on street vending” as one vendor shared her thoughts. ”
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If the government put a ban on street vending, I think I would end up being a street
beggar or a theft,” another vendor rhetorically said.
We, therefore, propose the following solutions. First, if lawmakers see the
potential of street vending interfering with the development of modern cities, their
regulations should phase in period rather than be implemented rapidly. Vocational
educational education opportunities should also be provided to street vendors to provide
them with the necessary skills to find other jobs. Besides, street vendors that are over 60
year old (4.85% of the total street vendors surveyed) should be given a helping hand in
finding a place where they can be taken care of for the rest of their lives. Also, we
recommend that street vendors be treated like real entrepreneurs. Zones for street vending
should be extended and defined clearly. Street vending should be legally protected and
taxes are collected in these areas. A number of street vendors revealed that they were
willing to pay taxes as long as the government let them street vend. In addition, there
should be an organization to protect street vendors’ rights. A big number of street
vendors confessed that they did not understand all the regulations that have direct effects
on them. “When the police approach, I just run away. I do not know whether I am wrong
or not”, one street vendor told us.

38

CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have sought to explore the relationships between mesoinstitutional elements and the intent to quit business among microentrepreneurs. We have
found a statistically significant relationship between actions as rules and street vendor’s
intent to give up their businesses. As their perception of actions as rules increases, their
intent to quit a business decreases. Besides, results suggest a negative correlation between
perception of diminished utilities of regulatory control and intent to exit business.
Contrary to what we hypothesized, retrospective legitimization, however, does not
negatively correlate with microentrepreneurs’ intent to quit their business. Given the
changing institutional environment in Vietnam, we find this study of relative importance
to the survival of vendors alongside streets in big cities in Vietnam. Some street vendors
asked us if this survey served them any good; we are in great hope that this paper will be
of considerable value for policy makers in Vietnam.
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APPENDIX

Western Kentucky University
A Leading American University with International Reach

Survey of Vietnamese Street Vendors
The purpose of this survey is to better understand the challenges of running a street
vending business. Your expertise is highly valued and will help us become more aware of
some of the difficulties you and other street vendors encounter.
Your answers are completely confidential. The researchers are the only ones who will see
the surveys. Surveys from a large number of street vendors will be combined in the final
report. The final report will not identify any individual street vendors to be certain that
your answers are completely confidential.
If you would like a copy of the final report, please contact the principal investigator, Mai
Tran, using the following contact information.
Mai Tran
169/1 Tran Phu, Da Nang
(0511) 3827578
mai.tran189@wku.edu
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Strongly Disagree

Somewhat Disagree

Neither Agree nor Disagree

Somewhat Agree

Strongly Agree

Part A: Please indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with the following statements.

1.

Regulations will never stop street vending.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

As rural to urban migration increases, the number of
street vending will also increase.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

I would continue to be a street vendor even the
government tells me I must quit.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

It is more important to earn a living than to follow
regulations.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

Restrictions on street vending will be reversed if they
are unpopular among street vendors’ customers.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

As long as my vending does not generate a crowd, the
police will leave me alone.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

If street vending increases employment rates,
lawmakers will likely make street vending legal.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

Existing regulations restricting street vending will be
changed if they have little effect on street vending
activities.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

Street vending regulations are ambiguous.

1

2

3

4

5

10. Street vending is only temporarily stopped when the
police come in but then continues once the police
leave.

1

2

3

4

5

11. In the future there will be zones where street vendors
are allowed and there will be zones where street

1

2

3

4

5
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vendors are not allowed.
12. People are still selling on the streets regardless of
regulations against street vending.

1

2

3

4

5

13. I will continue street vending.

1

2

3

4

5

14. I will find a permanent location for my business.

1

2

3

4

5

15. I will find another job in the city.

1

2

3

4

5

16. I will return to my hometown and start a new business.

1

2

3

4

5

17. I will return to my hometown and find a job in another
sector.

1

2

3

4

5

18. If the government prohibits street vending, I will be
unemployed.

1

2

3

4

5

In the future,

19. Others.
(Please
specify)_________________________________ .
Part B: Please provide additional information about you.
1.

Is this place your only location?
_____ Yes
_____ No

2.

Are you male or female?
_____ Male _____ Female

3.

How old are you?

_____ Less than 20
_____ 20 – 29
_____ 30 – 39

4.

_____ 40 – 49
_____ 50 – 59
_____ 60 or more

What is your highest level of formal education?
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5.

_____ None
_____ Elementary
_____ Secondary

_____ High School
_____ College
_____ Higher

Where do you live now?
_____ Ha Noi
_____ Hue

_____ Da Nang
_____ Ho Chi Minh City

6.

How long have you been street vending?
_____ Less than 1 year
_____ 1 – 5 years
_____ 5 – 10 years
_____ More than 10 years

7.

Do you believe you are making more, less, or about the same as the average
person in your city?
_____ More
_____ Less
_____ About the same

Thank you very much for your participation!
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Western Kentucky University
A Leading American University with International Reach

Nghiên Cứu về Người Bán Hàng Rong và Vỉa Hè ở Việt Nam
Mục đích của bài khảo sát này là để hiểu rõ hơn những thử thách của việc kinh doanh
hàng rong và vỉa hè ở Việt Nam. Những ý kiến đóng góp của anh/chị sẽ giúp chúng tôi
hiểu rõ hơn về những khó khăn mà anh/chị và những người buôn bán hàng rong khác gặp
phải.
Câu trả lời của anh/chị sẽ được giữ hoàn toàn bí mật. Những người nghiên cứu là những
người duy nhất tiếp cận kết quả khảo sát. Kết quả thu được sẽ được tóm tắt trong một bản
báo cáo tổng kết chính thức. Bản báo cáo chính thức sẽ không tiết lộ thông tin cá nhân
người tham gia khảo sát.
Nếu anh/chị muốn tham khảo bản báo cáo chính thức, xin vui lòng liên hệ Trần Nhật Mai
theo những thông tin sau:
Trần Nhật Mai
169/1 Trần Phú, Đà Nẵng
(0511) 3827578
mai.tran189@wku.edu
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Hoàn toàn không đồng ý

Phần nào không đồng ý

Không có ý kiến

Đồng ý phần nào

Hoàn toàn đồng ý

1.

Quy định về hạn chế hàng rong cũng không chấm dứt
được buôn bán hàng rong.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

Nếu người nhập cư từ nông thôn lên thành phố tăng lên,
số lượng người bán hàng rong cũng sẽ tăng lên.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

Tôi vẫn sẽ tiếp tục buôn bán hàng rong ngay cả khi chính
quyền bắt tôi phải bỏ nghề.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Theo tôi, kiếm sống quan trọng hơn là tuân theo những
quy định.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

Những quy định ngăn cấm buôn bán hàng rong sẽ bị bãi
bỏ nếu người dân không ủng hộ.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

Công an sẽ không can thiệp việc buôn bán của tôi nếu
gian hàng của tôi không làm tụ tập đám đông gây mất
trật tự.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

Nếu buôn bán hàng rong giúp tạo thêm việc làm, nhà
nước sẽ cho phép hàng rong trở thành hợp pháp.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

Những quy định hiện tại về hạn chế hàng rong sẽ được
thay đổi vì nó không ảnh hưởng nhiều đến hoạt động
buôn bán hàng rong.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

Những quy định về buôn bán hàng rong còn mơ hồ đối
với tôi.

1

2

3

4

5

10

Ở một số nơi, buôn bán hàng rong chỉ tạm thời dừng khi
công an can thiệp, nhưng sẽ lại tiếp tục khi công an bỏ
đi.

1

2

3

4

5

11

Trong tương lai sẽ có những khu vực mà buôn bán hàng

1

2

3

4

5

A. Xin anh/chị hãy cho biết ý kiến về những ý sau
đây. (Đánh dấu vào câu trả lời tương ứng)
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rong là hợp pháp và có những khu vực mà buôn bán hàng
rong là bất hợp pháp.
12

Ở một số nơi, hàng rong vẫn diễn ra bất chấp luật cấm.

1

2

3

4

5

Trong tương lai,
13

Tôi vẫn sẽ tiếp tục bán hàng rong.

1

2

3

4

5

14

Tôi sẽ tìm một nơi buôn bán hơp pháp cố định.

1

2

3

4

5

15

Tôi sẽ tìm một việc khác trong thành phố.

1

2

3

4

5

16

Tôi sẽ về quê để buôn bán.

1

2

3

4

5

17

Tôi sẽ về quê và tìm một công việc khác.

1

2

3

4

5

18

Nếu nhà nước cấm buôn bán hàng rong, tôi sẽ bị thất
nghiếp.

1

2

3

4

5

19

Ý kiến khác.
(Xin vui lòng làm
rõ)______________________________ .

B. Xin vui lòng cung cấp thêm thông tin về anh/chị. (Đánh dấu vào câu trả lời
tương ứng)
1. Anh/chị chỉ buôn bán tại địa điểm này?
_____ Đúng
_____ Sai
2. _____ Nam

_____ Nữ

3. Anh/chị bao nhiêu tuổi ?
_____ Dưới 20 tuổi

_____ 40-49 tuổi

_____ 20-29 tuổi

_____ 50-59 tuổi

_____ 30-39 tuổi

_____ 60 tuổi trở lên
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4. Trình độ học vấn chính quy cao nhất của anh/chị :
_____ Không

_____ Cấp 3

_____ Tiểu học

_____ Đại học

_____ Cấp 2

_____ Trên đại học

5. Anh/chị hiện đang ở :
_____ Hà Nội
_____ Huế
_____ Đà Nẵng
_____ TP Hồ Chí Minh
6. Anh/chị đã bán hàng rong được bao lâu ?
_____ Dưới 1 năm
_____ 1-5năm
_____ 5-10 năm
_____ >10 năm
7. Anh/chị nghĩ mình thu nhập cao hơn, thấp hơn, hay tương đương với mức trung bình
của thành phố ?
_____ Cao hơn
_____ Thấp hơn
_____ Tương đương

Cảm ơn anh/chị rất nhiều !
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